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The Making and Debunking of Legal
Tradition
Amalia D. Kessler*
I would like to tackle one particular aspect of the relationship
between comparative law and society - specifically, the impact of
such forces as history in shaping the law. In particular, I am
interested in exploring the tension between history and
comparative law as modes of partisan argument on the one hand
and as methods of scholarly analysis, on the other. Put
differently, I would like to discuss the important and interrelated
roles played by history and the comparative perspective in both
the making and debunking of legal tradition.
Both history and the comparative perspective function as
what we might call "tradition-makers." They serve to legitimize
legal rules or institutions by anchoring them within a particular
tradition, be this historical or comparative. In this sense, both
history and the comparative perspective are modes of discourse
deployed for strategic purposes-to justify the legal status quo or
to demand its reform. The utility of both these modes of discourse
stems from the fact that their point of reference lies outside the
immediate context. In this way, history and the comparative
perspective achieve a distance that endows them with a certain
argumentative plasticity.
In the case of historical discourse, disputants point to
(differing) facts from the past as a way of constructing alternative
traditions in support of their conflicting strategic goals. One of
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the more obvious examples in the domestic American context is
advocacy for the existence (or non-existence) of constitutional
rights. Frequently this discourse takes the form of a debate over
the historical origins and meaning of particular constitutional
text. Thus, proponents of a constitutional right to bear arms
insist that the Second Amendment must be interpreted in light of
the existence of a longstanding historical tradition affirming such
a right. Opponents, in turn, insist that there is no such tradition
- and to the contrary, the tradition has been to deny any such
private right to bear arms. Similarly, in the European context, we
have seen advocates for the creation of a unified, transnational
body of European civil law seek to justify its viability and
desirability by pointing to its historical origins in the ius commune
or common law of medieval and early modern Europe. Their
opponents, in turn, deny any continuous historical tradition
linking the ius commune to the present and depict the rise of
national law from the late eighteenth century onward as a
definitive break with the past.
Like history, the comparative perspective facilitates the
strategic construction of a legal tradition by permitting a certain
distance from the immediate context - though the distance is
primarily geographic, rather than chronological in nature. The
object of comparison is constructed as "the other"- as a foil
against which to applaud or to decry domestic rules or institutions
and thus to argue for their preservation or reform. For example,
generations of American lawyers and legal scholars have pointed
to the European legal tradition in order to highlight the
supposedly distinctive, contrasting virtues of its American
counterpart. In particular, they have emphasized European
commitment to inquisitorial modes of process and to a
bureaucratic judicial structure as a means of underlining the
United States' determination to protect the individual from an
overreaching state and to uphold such judicial values as
creativity, common sense, and equity. In this way, American
lawyers have long sought to shield their institutions from any
meaningful threat of reform, while at the same time elevating the
status of the legal profession by casting it as the natural guardian
of virtuous domestic traditions.
History and the comparative perspective, however, are not
simply modes of discourse subject to strategic deployment in the
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argumentative field. As forms of academic discipline, they stand
- or at least, in my view, should seek to stand--outside the realm
of immediate, partisan pressures. In this capacity, history and the
comparative perspective function to critique their strategic uses
by helping us to reflect on the constructed nature of tradition as
such. Deployed to achieve such academic goals, history and the
comparative perspective function not as the makers of tradition,
but instead, as its debunkers. Once again, it is the distance that
history and the comparative perspective afford from the
immediate context that is key to their success in this regard.
By reflecting back on the past, the historian can detect the
strategic maneuvers underlying the construction of a particular
legal tradition - the ways in which certain facts are given
particular emphasis, while others are subtly occluded or
ruthlessly cast aside. To take an example from recent work of
mine, 1 consider the evolution of the now widely accepted view that
the French judiciary (like that of continental European nations
more generally) is structured as a civil-service bureaucracy.
While this account is so established as to be essentially beyond
cavil, even the briefest review of the contemporary French judicial
landscape suggests that it is woefully incomplete, and thus
misleading. The French judiciary includes numerous commercial
and labor courts that simply do not fit this bureaucratic model.
Judges in these courts lack formal judicial (and usually legal)
training of any kind and are elected mid-career to serve temporary
terms of office. The commercial and labor courts have thus been
marginalized within the prevailing account of the French judiciary
as a civil-service bureaucracy. The historian can help shed light
on this odd state of affairs by tracing how the civil-service
bureaucracy account of the French judicial tradition first came to
be constructed in the early to mid-nineteenth century.
Specifically, the historian can discover and examine the strategic
purposes that the traditional account was designed to serve -
namely, to distance allegedly modern French judicial institutions
from a much-reviled corporatist past, and to elevate the power and
status of a beleaguered legal profession by marginalizing those
1. See generally, Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The
Corporatist Roots of France's Forgotten Elective Judiciary, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
679 (2010).
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judicial institutions in which such professionals played little role.
Like the historian, the comparatist uses her distance from the
legal culture under examination to illuminate the constructed
nature of its traditions. To continue with the previous example, it
is those outside the French legal system who are in the best
position to observe the obvious, the somehow neglected fact that
important French courts simply do not conform to the standard
account of the French judiciary as a civil-service bureaucracy.
While those inside the system have been indoctrinated with this
traditional account from an early age through schooling, press
reports, and the like, those outside can observe it with fresh eyes.
Along these lines, it is telling that at the very same moment that
nineteenth-century French jurists were first constructing an
account of their judiciary that all but erased the existence of the
commercial and labor courts, their American counterparts were
emphasizing the important role played by these institutions in the
French judicial system. In particular, as I have argued elsewhere,
nineteenth-century American lawyers extensively debated the
desirability of transplanting what they called "conciliation
courts"- including the French commercial and labor courts - to
American soil. 2  From their perspective as outsiders, these
institutions were, in short, fundamental components of the French
judicial landscape.
Where does this leave us? As suggested by the viewpoint of
both history and comparative law, the French tradition of a civil-
service bureaucracy is less solid and imposing than might
otherwise seem to be the case. History and comparative law, in
other words, teach that tradition is neither necessary nor
inevitable, but instead the contingent outcome of a struggle in
which particular groups seek to advance their own, strategic
interests. In my view, that is precisely the point of the scholarly
endeavor. By questioning the necessity or inevitability of
tradition, it frees the present from the grip of the past and
removes the blinders that inhere in an overly local and narrow
perspective - thereby making change possible. This is not, of
course, to suggest that the scholar can herself stand entirely
2. See generally, Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The
Nineteenth-Century Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a
Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 423 (2009).
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outside of the argumentative field - that the attainment of truly
neutral ground is possible. After all, most scholarly work is itself
motivated by some kind of engagement with the immediate,
domestic context. However, we can choose to embrace the idea of
such neutral ground as our lodestar. Whether and to what degree
we have succeeded can then be measured by the extent to which
our efforts serve to generate, rather than to end discussion. As
makers of tradition, history and the comparative perspective seek
argumentative finality. As its debunkers, history and the
comparative perspective aspire to nothing more nor less than to
open the debate.
